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German Council on Foreign Relations
Blurry  
Counterterrorism
A Chance for Russia,  
A Risk for Europe
The European Union should actively 
address the problematic use of coun-
terterrorism by non-European states 
– especially Russia – and make it a 
permanent aspect in developing coun-
terterrorism strategies and agendas. 
Failing to address the misuse of coun-
terterrorism sends the wrong signal not 
only to those with reason to fear geo-
political interference by their countries 
of origin, but also to states that pursue 
“anti-terrorist-operations” in the form 
of abductions and executions abroad. 
The terrorist attacks in Paris, Dres-
den, Nice, and Vienna in autumn 2020 
served as dramatic reminders of the 
enduring threat that Islamist terrorism 
poses to Europe. In a timely response, 
the European Commission published 
its new counterterrorism agenda in 
early December 2020. 
More specifically, however, the murder 
of French teacher Samuel Paty near 
Paris on October 16 also highlight-
ed two pressing issues that are often 
overlooked: first, the Chechen origin 
of the attacker and, second, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin’s subsequent 
offer to support the fight against ter-
rorism in the European Union (EU) and 
its member states. The Russian regime 
uses counterterrorism (CT) measures 
and operations to increase repressive 
policies at home and enhance its inter-
national influence abroad. This misuse 
should motivate actors in the EU’s CT 
sector to address ways of dealing with 
Russia in light of its problematic con-





Russia’s problematic conception and 
execution of CT and Putin’s geostra-
tegic interests in international CT co-
operation are both widely acknowl-
edged and discussed. In March 2020, 
Jakob Hedenskog, deputy and research 
director of the Swedish Defence Re-
search Agency (FOI), presented a com-
parative analysis that mapped Russia’s 
international CT engagement and re-
porting on problematic interests in co-
operation with Russia. 
A vivid example of a domestic “an-
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Second Chechen War (1999–2009) de-
clared by Putin after a series of bomb-
ings in Moscow for which he held 
Chechen terrorists responsible. An in-
ternational example for a military en-
gagement termed an “anti-terror-
ist-operation” is Russia’s intervention 
in the Syrian civil war. Given the prov-
en fact that Russia allowed many do-
mestic extremists – especially from the 
North Caucasus – to travel to the Syri-
an battlefield, observers doubt its stat-
ed motive for engaging in that war. 
Russia’s international CT agenda also 
has diplomatic dimensions. Through 
its engagement in the Shanghai Coop-
eration Organisation and as a perma-
nent member of United Nations Se-
curity Council, the Russian regime is 
continually pushing to play a leading 
role in the international fight against 
terrorism. Russian officials current-
ly hold leadership positions with-
in the UN’s CT architecture. Vladimir 
Voronkov serving as Under-Secretary 
General of the United Nations Office 
of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) is just 
one prominent example. 
That Russia understands the fight 
against extremism and terrorism 
mainly in the context of its own in-
ternational engagement – both mil-
itary and diplomatic – but certain-
ly not in the context of strengthening 
civil society, deradicalization, and dis-
engagement work is, at the very least, 
problematic. The Commission on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe, also 
known as the US Helsinki Commission, 
addressed these concerns in an expert 
hearing in June 2019 under the illustra-
tive heading “Russia’s Counterproduc-
tive Counterterrorism.” 
THE EU’S DEAD 
ANGLE: THE CHECHEN 
DIASPORA IN EUROPE
For Europe, international concerns 
about Russia’s CT strategy also have a 
strong internal component that needs 
to be given more attention: the impor-
tance of people from the North Cauca-
sus for CT efforts and deradicalization 
work in Europe. This became appar-
ent as the Second Chechen War caused 
many people from the North Caucasus 
to flee to Europe and in the context of 
the so called Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS). Russian-speaking fighters 
constitute one of the largest groups of 
foreign supporters in ISIS. This is not 
only due to people leaving Russia itself; 
according to Europol and information 
from the International Crisis Group, 
some 2,400 members of the Chechen 
diaspora in Europe traveled to Syria. 
Source: Neil Hauer, “Chechen and North Caucasian Militants in Syria,” Atlantic Council, January 18, 2008: https://www.atlanticcouncil.
org/blogs/syriasource/chechen-and-north-caucasian-militants-in-syria; Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now 

























That the majority of 
North Caucasian 
Islamists departed from 
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The threat posed to Europe by net-
works of returning foreign terror-
ist fighters was demonstrated when 
a Chechen was arrested in Italy in 
2017 for terrorist recruitment after he 
fought in Syria between 2014 and 2015. 
Another argument for the relevance of 
radicalized North Caucasians for CT, 
deradicalization, and disengagement 
work in Europe is the aforementioned 
murder of French teacher Samuel Paty, 
which underlines the imminent threat 
stemming from homegrown radical-
ized Chechens in Europe. 
One of the biggest challenges for ac-
tors in deradicalization work engag-
ing with North Caucasian individuals is 
their deeply rooted mistrust, particu-
larly against governmental and security 
authorities. This form of mistrust often 
occurs in individuals from authoritarian 
countries – for example, Turkey – but is 
particularly strong in the case of North 
Caucasians. Practitioners link this to 
their frequent experiences of violence 
and abuse perpetrated by domestic se-
curity actors back in Russia. 
Furthermore, other incidents point to-
ward operations and attacks that pur-
sue nationally-driven agendas against 
“domestic terrorists” abroad. These 
include the murder of a Georgian of 
Chechen origin in Berlin in August 
2019 – the so-called Tiergartenmord, 
for which strong evidence suggests the 
involvement of the Russian regime – 
and the assassination of a Chechen re-
gime critic in Austria in 2020. 





Naturally, deradicalization efforts are 
not independent from CT efforts. Yet, 
a key distinction – one especially rel-
evant to this context – is that derad-
icalization work relies heavily on civ-
il society actors. Russia, in particular, 
is more than skeptical about civil soci-
ety’s participation in CT and, thus, pri-
oritizes a state-led and state-centric 
approach. Additionally, authoritarian 
regimes, like Russia, use CT as an ar-
gument to suppress domestic political 
opposition. This fact shapes the con-
text of efforts associated with coun-
tering terrorism and creates a relevant 
difference in how people in Europe 
and Russia perceive CT. 
It is crucial for affected individuals to 
understand the difference between 
CT efforts and deradicalization work 
and be able to comprehend the con-
text in which contact persons are en-
gaging with them. Given that many 
of these individuals are used to see-
ing states behave and use their pow-
er differently, it is already challenging 
to build required relationships of trust. 
Addressing CT and deradicalization 
work together – as in the EU’s new CT 
agenda – only increases confusion and 
results in isolating retreats from both 
exit and counselling work. Instead, the 
EU must support its civil society de-
radicalization work by building a poli-
cy environment in which aspects of CT 
and deradicalization work are likewise 
supported but can also be clearly dis-
tinguished from each other in terms of 
objectives and purposes. 
Source: European Commission, “A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond,” December 9, 2020: https://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/pdf/09122020_communication_com mission_european_parliament_the_council_eu_
agenda_counter_terrorism_po-2020-9031_com-2020_795_en.pdf 
Share information and cooperate across disciplines 
and levels to better anticipate existing and emerging 
threats in Europe 
Prevent by addressing and better countering  
radicalization and extremist ideologies before  
they take root; prevent attacks from occuring 
Protect Europeans by continuing to reduce  
vulnerabilities (particularly in public spaces) and 
modernize the management of external borders 
Rely on the EU’s operational support agencies  
(Europol and Eurojust) and an appropriate legal 






















THE FOUR PILLARS OF THE EU’S COUNTERTERRORISM AGENDA
Subordinating prevention and the countering of extremism to counterterrorism
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APPROACHES IN EU 
COUNTERTERRORISM
The European Commission should 
clearly address problematic concep-
tions and executions of CT in non-Eu-
ropean countries. CT depends on 
security, political, and judicial cooper-
ation, as well as on other effective in-
formation-sharing networks. Also, the 
application of CT measures according 
to EU standards must be ensured – at 
least on European soil. Failing to con-
sider and address misuse of CT sends 
the wrong signal: not only to those 
with reason to fear geopolitical inter-
ference by their countries of origin, 
but also to states that might consider 
pursuing “anti-terrorist-operations” in 
the form of abductions and executions 
abroad. In order to better integrate its 
approaches to counterterrorism, the 
EU should take two steps:
1.  Investigate and monitor the prob-
lematic conception and execution  
of counterterrorism efforts
Addressing the problematic concep-
tions and executions of CT strategies 
and geostrategic interests in interna-
tional CT cooperation must not only 
take place through research, but also 
on a policy level by the European Com-
mission. Monitoring and investigat-
ing other countries’ understanding of 
terrorism and the related definition of 
terrorists needs to be a permanent as-
pect of developing and formulating CT 
efforts. An expert committee can assist 
in implementing such policies; includ-
ing central stakeholders from the re-
spective countries can help to maintain 
transnational dialogue. This is partic-
ularly urgent in the case of Russia but 
certainly also holds true in the context 
of other countries, such as Turkey.  
2.  Support, fund, and initiate critical 
studies on counterterrorism 
The EU already supports research to 
enhance deradicalization efforts on 
national, regional, and local levels. Re-
search on problematic key interests in 
international CT cooperation and com-
parative analyses of differing under-
standings of terrorism are also already 
taking place. These studies, however, 
need to be further supported and ex-
tended so that they inform EU policy-
makers. Monitoring potential strategic 
interests in CT measures must become 
a permanent control mechanism when 
developing CT agendas to prevent mis-
use, increase trust, and prevent the 
unintended impediment of deradical-
ization work. 
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